### Killjoy K – 1NC

#### Speech is an expression of will, but the voice of the oppressed is lost as it becomes docile. Violence becomes the corrective tool to reorient non-conforming bodies into obedience with oppressive rule systems "for their own good"

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The story gives us a portrait of obedience as virtue. We could thus consider how the project of eliminating willfulness relates to obedience. Aquinas in his reflection on the virtue of obedience refers to the work of Gregory who argues that obedience has “more merit” the “less it has of its own will” (Summa Theologiae, 2a.2ae.104.60). For Gregory obedience becomes a virtue when persons obey commands that do not go in the direction of their own will. There is no virtue in obeying a command that is agreeable to one’s own will: “obedience requires little or no effort when it has as its own will in agreeable things.” Rather “the effort is greater in disagreeable or difficult things.” Obedience occurs when one’s “own will tends to nothing apart from the command” (63). This is how Gregory can conclude that “by obedience we slay our own will” (64). To obey is to go where your will would not take you. Willfulness might refer to willing in agreement with one’s own will. Another way of putting this would be to say that a willful will is one that wills what it wants, and that has yet to eliminate want from will.6 As I noted in my introduction to this book, the Grimm story can be considered as part of the educational tradition described by Alice Miller (1987) as “poisonous pedagogy.” Miller draws on the earlier work of Katharina Rutschky who describes this tradition (problematically) as “Black pedagogy,” which has as its primary aim “the domination and control of the child for the child’s own good” (Zornado 2001, 79).7 As Joseph L. Zornado points out, following both Rutschky and Miller, this pedagogy rests on willfulness: “Because the child is willful, stained by original sin and destructive, the adult must enact decisive and punitive measures so that the child will not grow up ‘full of weeds’ ” (2001, 79). **The violence toward the child is thus presented as being for the child**. One of the examples of poisonous pedagogy quoted at length by Alice Miller is J. Sulzer’s An Essay on the Education and Instruction of Children (1784).8 I will follow Miller in quoting this essay at length as it gives us a fuller and affective picture of what is at stake in the history of willfulness. In Sulzer’s essay willfulness is described as that which must be “driven out” before children can receive a good education. Willfulness is an obstacle to the educable will: As far as willfulness is concerned, this expresses itself as a natural recourse in tenderest childhood as soon as children are able to make their desire for something known by means of gestures. They see something they want but cannot have; they become angry, cry, and flail about. Or they are given something that does not please them; they fling it aside and begin to cry. Th ese are dangerous faults that hinder their entire education and encourage undesirable qualities in children. If willfulness and wickedness are not driven out, it is impossible to give a child a good education. Th e moment these flaws appear in a child, it is high time to resist this evil so that it does not become ingrained through habit and the children do not become thoroughly depraved. (cited in Miller 1987, 10– 11) Indeed driving out willfulness, Sulzer suggests, should be the “main occupation” of those concerned with the education of children. He argues that driving out willfulness must be done “in a methodical manner”; other wise children “will finally become the masters of their parents and of their nursemaids and will have a bad, willful, and unbearable disposition with which they will trouble and torment their parents ever after as the well- earned reward for the ‘good’ upbringing they were given” (11). **The rod makes an appearance as the proper instrument for moral correction:** “If parents are fortunate enough to drive out willfulness from the very beginning by means of scolding and the rod, they will have obedient, docile, and good children whom they can later provide with a good education” (11). The rod and scolding are techniques of parental will that aim to create a docile child. Note here that **docility appears an end of will, as what will,** transformed into a disciplinary technique, **is intended to actualize.** As such the will seeks to eliminate the child’s will, understood as willful insofar as it is his own: “A child who is used to obeying his parents will also willingly submit to the laws and rules of reason once he is on his own and his own master, since he is already accustomed not to act in accordance with his own will. Obedience is so important that all education is actually nothing other than learning how to obey” (12, emphasis added). Becoming obedient is learning to act without accordance to one’s own will. If children are to act without self- accordance, their own will must be broken: It is not very easy, however, to implant obedience in children. It is quite natural for the child’s soul to want to have a will of its own, and things that are not done correctly in the first two years will be diffi cult to rectify thereafter. One of the advantages of these early years is that then force and compulsion can be used. Over the years, children forget everything that happened to them in early childhood. If their wills can be broken at this time, they will never remember afterwards that they had a will, and for this very reason the severity that is required will not have any serious consequences. Just as soon as children develop awareness, it is essential to demonstrate to them by word and deed that they must submit to the will of their parents. Obedience requires children to (1) willingly do as they are told, (2) willingly refrain from doing what is forbidden, and (3) accept the rules made for their sake. (13) **To eliminate willfulness is thus to eliminate not only the will defined as independence from what is willed by others, but to eliminate the very memory of this will or at least to aim for this elimination**. The child’s identification with parental will would become so complete that identification is experienced as willingness, as not only willingly doing what they are commanded to do, but as being this doing, as having always been this doing. Once the child is willing, any memory of having a will that was willing other wise is eradicated. Or at least that is the idea. A subject that is willing to obey is a subject without will: a willing subject becomes a will- less subject. What is this subject required to do? Katharina Rutschky explores how the genre of poisonous pedagogy provided the psychic conditions for the emergence of Fascism within Germany in the twentieth century (creating subjects whose obedience rested on the acceptance and perpetration of cruelty and punishment). As Alice Miller shows in For Your Own Good, we can track the emergence of poisonous pedagogy across Europe and America during the eighteenth century. Take, for example, the work of John Wesley who was influenced by Arminian doctrines. Wesley writes of children: “Break their wills betimes. Begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, before they can speak at all. Whatever pains it costs, break the will, if you would not damn the child. Let the child from a year old be taught to fear the rod; and to cry softly; from that age, make him do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times running to effect it. If you do spare the rod, you spoil the child; if you do not conquer you ruin him” (1811, 71). **If breaking the will is painful it is understood as necessary pain. This pain must be prior even to speech.** **The child must be conquered to avoid damnation**. Reading these literatures is difficult given how violence against children is rationalized and enacted in the works themselves. The works are implicated in the **histories** they enact; they **are conduits of violence**. In the brutish maxim “Spare the rod, spoil the child,” history is summarized as instruction. When reading about Wesley, I came across another text by the twentieth- century Baptist evangelical John Rice. He asks how John Wesley and his brother Christopher as leaders of the Evangelical movement and founders of Methodism were themselves taught. Rice notes: “Their mother Susannah Wesley taught them to fear the rod when they were a year old” (1946, 213). Rice himself then follows Wesley in arguing that “when the will of a child is totally subdued, and it is brought to revere and stand in awe of the parents, then a great many childhood follies and inadvertencies may be passed by. . . . No willful transgression should ever be forgiven children. . . . as self- will is the root of all sin and misery, so what ever cherishes this in children insures their after- wretchedness and irreligion” (213). After- wretchedness: this history is indeed a wretched history. To follow the figure of the willful child is to stay proximate to scenes of violence. And we learn too how those beaten by the rod become rods that beat. **This becoming is not inevitable, but it is part of a history we cannot afford to forget. It is a history still with us.**9 **Assembling a willfulness archive is a way of attending to histories that are kept alive by forgetting**

#### The aff is complacent in joy and The Killjoy exposes a genealogy between rebellion and punishment in the law. Our strive towards being unhappy and sacrificing happiness is what liberates us from the complacency of oppression inside the institutions walls.

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Going along with this duty can mean simply approximating the signs of being happy — passing as happy — in order to keep things in the right place. **Feminist genealogies can be described as genealogies of women who not only do not place their hopes for happiness in the right things but who speak out about their unhappiness with the very obligation to be made happy by such things**. **The history of feminism is thus a history of** making trouble,^ a history of women who refuse to become Sophy, by refusing to follow other people’s goods, or by **refusing to make others happy**. The female troublemaker might be trouble because she gets in the way of the happiness of others. Judith Butler shows how the figure of the troublemaker exposes the intimacy of rebellion and punishment within the law. As she argues in her preface to Gender Trouble. “To make trouble was, within the reigning discourse of my childhood, something one should never do precisely because that would get one in trouble. The rebellion and its reprimand seemed to be caught up in the same terms, a phenomenon that gave rise to my first critical insight into the subtle ruse of power: The prevailing law threatened one with trouble, even put one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble” (1950: vii). Happiness might be what keeps you out of trouble only by evoking the unhappiness of getting into trouble. We can consider how nineteenth century bildungsroman novels by women writers offered a rebellion against Emile in the narrativization of the limitations of moral education for girls and its narrow precepts of happiness. Such novels are all about the intimacy of trouble and happiness. Take, for example, George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, which is told from the point of view of Maggie Tulliver.'^° The early stages of the novel depict Maggie’s childhood, the difficulty of her relationship with her brother Torn, and her perpetual fear of disappointing her parents. The novel contrasts Tom and Maggie in terms of how they are judged by their parents: “Tom never did the same sort of foolish things as Maggie, having a wonderful instinctive discernment of what would turn to his advantage or disadvantage; and so it happened that though he was much more willful and inflexible than Maggie, his mother hardly ever called him naughty” ([i860] 1965: 73). Various incidents occur that contribute to Maggie’s reputation as a troublemaker: when she lets Tom’s dogs die (37); when she cuts her dark hair (73); when she knocks over Tom’s building blocks (96); and when she pushes their cousin Lucy into the water (111-12). **The novel shows us how trouble does not simply reside within individuals but involves ways of reading situations of conflict and struggle. Reading such situations involves locating the cause of trouble, which is another way of talking about conversion points: the troublemaker is the one who violates the fragile conditions of peace.** If in all these instances Maggie is attributed as the cause of trouble, then **what does not get noticed is the violence that makes her act in the way that she does, as the violence of provocation that hovers in the background**. Even when Tom is told off, it is Maggie who is the reference point in situations of trouble. Mrs. Tulliver says to Tom: “'Then go and fetch her in this minute, you naughty boy. And how could you think o’ going to pond and taking your sister where there was dirt. You know she’ll do mischief if there’s mischief to be done.’ It was Mrs. Tulliver’s way, if she blamed Tom, to refer his misdemeanor, somehow or other, to Maggie” (114), Maggie gets into trouble because she is already read as being trouble before anything happens. Maggie gets into trouble for speaking; to speak is already a form of defiance if you are supposed to recede into the background. She speaks out when something happens that she perceives to be wrong. The crisis of the novel is when her father loses the mill, threatening his ability to look after his family. Maggie is shocked by the lack off sympathy and care they receive from their extended family, Maggie speaks back out of a sense of care for her parents: “Maggie, having hurled her defiance at aunts and uncles in this way, stood still, with her large dark eyes glaring at them as if she was ready to await all consequences. . . . ‘You haven’t seen the end o’ your trouble wi’ that child, Bessy,’ said Mrs Pullet; ‘she’s beyond everything for boldness and unthankfulness. Its dreadful. I might ha’ let alone paying for her schooling, for she’s worse nor ever’” (229). Girls who speak out are bold and thankless. It is important that Maggie is compelled to speak from a sense of injustice. Already we can witness the relationship between consciousness of injustice and being attributed as the cause of unhappiness. The novel relates **Maggie’s tendency to get into trouble with her desire, will, and imagination, with her love of new words that bring with them the promise of unfamiliar worlds**. For instance, she loves Latin because “she delighted in new words” (159). For Maggie “these mysterious sentences, snatched from an unknown context — like strange horns of beasts and leaves of unknown plants, brought from some far-off region—gave boundless scope to her imagination and were all the more fascinating because they were in a peculiar tongue of their own, which she could learn to interpret” (159-60), The association between imagination and trouble is powerful. It teaches us how **the happiness duty for women is about the narrowing of horizons, about giving up an interest in what lies beyond the familiar.** Returning to Emile, it is interesting that the danger of unhappiness is associated precisely with women having too much curiosity. At one point in the narrative, Sophy gets misdirected. Her imagination and desires are activated by reading too many books, leading to her becoming an “unhappy girl, overwhelmed with her secret grief” (4.39-40). If Sophy were to become too imaginative, we would not get our happy ending, premised on Sophy being given to Emile. The narrator says in response to the threat of such an unhappy ending, “Let us give Emile his Sophy; let us restore this sweet girl to life and provide her with a less vivid imagination and a happier fate” (441).\*^ Being restored to life is here being returned to the straight and narrow. Imagination is what makes women look beyond the script of happiness to a different fate. Having made Sophy sweet and unimaginative, the book can end happily. **Feminist readers might want to challenge this association between unhappiness and female imagination, which in the moral economy of happiness, makes female imagination a bad thing. But if we do not operate in this economy— that is, if we do not assume that happiness is what is good — then we can read the link between female imagination and unhappiness differently. We might explore how imagination is what allows women to be liberated from happiness and the narrowness of its horizons**. We might want the girls to read the books that enable them to be overwhelmed with grief.

#### The alt is a personal killjoy manifesto against the oppressive structures of happiness in academic spaces. We stand up against the complacency of happiness inside of the institution allows us to rupture the patriarchal and racialized history of the university's placating commitments. Our genealogy repeats the unhappy history of students and debaters alike, where every round forces the academic institution to continually take on the weight of its past. A manifesto allows us to use our personal experiences against the institution to reassert our wills and to collapse systems of violence. To be a killjoy is to be a political activist, a nonconforming queer, or the angry black woman. There can be joy in the killing of joy – our manifesto just determines a purpose of feminist flight.

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We must stay unhappy with this world. The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, some of which 1 discusses in chapter I (see also Ahmed 2010). Happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods. As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely, "It is always easy to describe a, happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others] (1949] 1997, 28). Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. A killjoy becomes a manifesto when we are willing to take up this figure, to assemble a life not as her (I discussed the risks of assuming we are her in chapter 7) but around her, in her company. We are willing to killjoy because the world that assigns this or that person or group of people as the killjoys is not to world a want to be part of. To be willing to killjoy is to transform a judgement into a project. A manifesto: how a judgment becomes a project. To think of killjoys as manifestos is to say that a politics of transformation, a politics that intends to cause the end of a system, is not a program of action that can be separates from how we are in the worlds we are in. Feminism is praxis. We enact the world we are aiming for; nothing Iess will do. Lesbian feminism, as I noted in chapter 9, is how we organize our lives in such a way that our relations to each other as women are not mediated through our relations to men. A life becomes an archive of rebellion, this is why a killjoy manifesto will be personal. Each of us killjoys will have our own. My manifesto does not suspend my personal story it is how that story unfolds into action. It is from difficult experiences, or being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we gain the energy to rebel It is from what we conic up against that we gain new angles on what we are against. Our bodies become our tools; our rage becomes sickness. We vomit; we vomit out what we have been asked to take in. Our guts become our feminist friends the more we are sickened. We begin to feel the weight of histories more and more; the more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. We snap under the weight; things break. A manifesto is written out of feminist snap. A manifesto is feminist snap. And: we witness as feminists the trouble feminism causes. I would hazard a guess; feminist trouble is an extension of gender trouble (Butler 1990). To be more specific: feminist trouble is the trouble with women. When we refuse to be women, in the heteropatriarchal sense as beings for men, we become trouble, we get into trouble. A killjoy is willing to get into trouble. And this I think is what is specific about a killjoy manifesto: that we bring into our statements of intent or purpose the experience of what we come up against. It is this experience that allows us to articulate a for, a for that carries with it an experience of what we come up against. A for can be how we turn Something about a manifesto is about what it aims to bring about. There is no doubt in my mind that a feminist killjoy is for something; although as killjoys we are not necessarily for the same things. But you would only be willing to live with the consequences of being against what you come up against if you are for something, A life can be a manifesto. When I read some of the books in my survival kit, I hear them as manifestos, as calls to action; as calls to arms. They are books that tremble with life because they show how a life can be rewritten; how we can rewrite a life, letter by letter. A manifesto has a life, a life of its own; a manifesto is an outstretched hand. And if a manifesto is a political action, it depends on how it is received by others. And perhaps a hand can do more when it is not simply received by another hand, when a gesture exceeds the firmness of a handshake. Perhaps more than a hand needs to shake, If a killjoy manifesto is a handle, it flies out of hand. A manifesto thus repeats something that has already happened' as we know the killjoy has flown off. Perhaps a killjoy manifesto is unhandy; a feminist flight. When we refuse to be the master’s tool, we expose the violence of rods, the violences that built the master's dwelling, brick by brick. When we make violence manifest, a violence that is reproduced by not being made a manifesto, we will be assigned as killjoys. It is because of what she reveals that a killjoy he - comes a killjoy in the first place. A manifesto is in some sense behind her. This is not to say that writing a killjoy manifesto is not also a commitment; that it is not also an idea if how to move forward. A killjoy has her principles. A killjoy manifesto shows how we create principles from an experience of what we come up against, from how we live a feminist life. When I say principles here, I do not mean rules of conduct that we must agree to in order to proceed in a common direction. I might say that a feminist life is principled but feminism often becomes an announcement at the very moment of the refusal to be bound by principle. When I think of feminist principles, I think of principles in the original sense: principle as a first step, as a commencement, a start of something. A principle can also be what is elemental to a craft. Feminist killjoys and other willful subjects are crafty; we are becoming crafty. There are principles in what we craft. How we begin does not determine where we end up„ but principles do give shape or direction. Feminist principles are articulated in unfeminist worlds. Living a life with feminist principles is thus not living smoothly; we bump into the world that does not live in accordance with the principles we try to live. For some reason, the principles I articulate here ended up being expressed as statements of will; of what a killjoy is willing (to do or to be) or not willing (to do or to be). I think we can understand the some of this reason. A killjoy manifesto is a willful subject; she wills wrongly by what she is willing or is not willing to do. No wonder a willful subject has principles; she can be principled. She can share them if you can bear them.

#### The role of the ballot is vote for the debater that best mobilizes unhappiness as a way to fight oppression. Our manifesto is an archive of happiness that extends beyond the resolution; the ballot becomes a form of affect – every reading of the alt elicits an rfd, decision, and refutation which create new impressions to shape identity to reclaim the liberatory potential of academic settings.

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Every writer is first a reader, and what we read matters. I think of myself primarily as a reader of feminist, queer, and antiracist books — these books form the intellectual and political horizon of this book. I would describe these books as my philosophy books in the sense that they are the books that have helped me to think about how happiness participates in the creation of social form. But my archive does not just include books or films. If you follow the word happiness you end up everywhere! So my archive is also my world, my life-world, my past as well as present, where the word happiness has echoed so powerfully. One of the speech acts that always fascinated me is “I just want you to be happy,” which I remember being said to me an awful lot when I was growing up. Writing this book has given me a chance to wonder more about what it means to express “just want” for the happiness of another. But this is just one kind of happiness speech act. There are many! Others you will encounter in this book include “I’m happy if you are happy,” “I cannot bear you to be un­ happy,” “I want to make you happy,” “I want to see you being happy,” and “I want to be the cause of the happiness that is inside you.” How often we speak of happiness! If my task is to follow the words, then I aim to describe what kind of world takes shape when it is given that the happiness of which we speak is good. The question “what does happiness do?” is inseparable from the question of how happiness and unhappiness are distributed over time and in space. To track the history of happiness is to track the history of its distribution. Happiness gets distributed in all sorts of complicated ways. Certainly to be a good subject is to be perceived as a happiness-cause, as making others happy. To be bad is thus to be a killjoy. This book is an attempt to give the killjoy back her voice and to speak from recognition of how it feels to inhabit that place. I thus draw on my own experiences of being called a killjoy in describing the sociability of happiness. So many of the discussions I have had about this research have involved “swapping killjoy stories.” I remember one time at a conference table when we were discussing being killjoys at the family table. The conference was organized by the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association in 2007, and it was the first time I had been to a conference in Australia as a person of color from Australia where I felt at home. I now think of spaces created by such conferences as providing new kinds of tables, perhaps tables that give support to those who are unseated by the tables of happiness. I know that I risk overemphasizing the problems with happiness by presenting happiness as a problem. It is a risk I am willing to take. If this book kills joy, then it does what it says we should do. To kill joy, as many of the texts I cite in the following pages teach us, is to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance. My aim in this book is to make room.

### Killjoy K – Link: Wound Fetishism

#### Transformation of the wound into an identity of its own is the essence of commodifying suffering. Remembrance is the only mechanism to counter wound fetishization—we need specific and constant connections to these histories

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How does pain enter politics? Does pain become political only through speech, or through claims for compensation? Pain has been considered by some as a very problematic ‘foundation’ for politics. Working with Nietzsche’s model of resentiment, for example, Wendy Brown argues that there has been a fetishisation of the wound in subaltern politics (Brown 1995: 55, see Nietzsche 1969). Subaltern subjects become invested in the wound, such that **the wound comes to stand for identity itself**. The political claims become claims of injury against something or somebody (society, the state, the middle classes, men, white people and so on) as a reaction or negation (Brown 1995: 73). Following Nietzsche, Brown suggests that **reactions to injury are inadequate as a basis of politics** since such reactions make action impossible: ‘Revenge as a “reaction”, **a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history’** (Brown 1995: 73).10 Brown’s reworking of Nietzsche shows how an over-investment in the wound, ‘come[s] into conflict with the need to give up these investments’ (Brown 1995: 73). I agree that the transformation of the wound into an identity is problematic. One of the reasons that it is problematic is precisely because of its fetishism: the transformation of the wound into an identity cuts the wound off from a history of ‘getting hurt’ or injured. **It turns the wound into something that simply ‘is’ rather than something that has happened in time and space**. The fetishisation of the wound as a sign of identity is crucial to ‘testimonial culture’ (Ahmed and Stacey 2001), in which narratives of pain and injury have proliferated. Sensational stories can turn pain into a form of media spectacle, in which the pain of others produces laughter and enjoyment, rather than sadness or anger. Furthermore, narratives of collective suffering increasingly have a global dimension. As Kleinman, Das and Lock argue, ‘**Collective suffering is also a core component of the global political economy. There is a market for suffering: victimhood is commodified’** (Kleinman, Das and Lock 1997: xi). This commodification of suffering does not mean that all narratives have value or even equal value: as I show in Chapters 6 and 7, following Judith Butler (2002b), some forms of suffering more than others will be repeated, as they can more easily be appropriated as ‘our loss’. The differentiation between forms of pain and suffering in stories that are told, and between those that are told and those that are not, is a crucial mechanism for the distribution of power. **We can reflect critically** on the culture of compensation, where all forms of injury are assumed to involve relations of innocence and guilt, and where it is assumed that responsibility for all injuries can be attributed to an individual or collective. The legal domain transforms pain into a condition that can be quantified as the basis for compensation claims. The problem of wound fetishism is the equivalence it assumes between forms of injury. The production of equivalence allows injury to become an entitlement, which is then equally available to all others. It is no accident then that **the normative subject is often secured through narratives of injury**: the white male subject, for example, has become an injured party in national discourses (see Chapter 2), as the one who has been ‘hurt’ by the opening up of the nation to others. Given that subjects have an unequal relation to entitlement, then more privileged subjects will have a greater recourse to narratives of injury. That is, the more access subjects have to public resources, the more access they may have to the capacity to mobilise narratives of injury within the public domain. How should we respond to this transformation of injury into an entitlement that secures such forms of privilege? I would suggest that **our response should not simply be to critique the rhetorical use of injury or ‘wounds’, but to attend to the different ways in which ‘wounds’ enter politics**. Not all narratives of pain and injury work as forms of entitlement; so for example, to read the story of white male injury as the same as stories of subaltern injury would be an unjust reading. Whilst we cannot assume that such differences are essential, or determined ‘only’ by the subject’s relation to power, we also cannot treat differences as incidental, and as separated from relations of power. The **critique of wound culture should not operate as generalised critique**, which would mean ‘reading’ different testimonies as symptomatic. As Carl Gutiérrez-Jones argues, the critique of injury needs to recognise the different rhetorical forms of injury as signs of an uneven and antagonistic history (Gutiérrez-Jones 2001: 35). So a good response to Brown’s critique would **not** be ‘**to forget’ the wound or indeed the past as the scene of wounding.** Brown does ‘part company’ with Nietzsche by suggesting that ‘the counsel of forgetting... seems inappropriate if not cruel’ for subjugated peoples who have yet to have their pain recognised (Brown 1995: 74). I would put this more strongly: **forgetting would be a repetition of the violence or injury.** To forget would be to repeat the forgetting that is already implicated in the fetishisation of the wound. **Our task might** instead **be to ‘remember’ how the surfaces of bodies** (including the bodies of communities, as I will suggest later) **came to be wounded in the first place**. Reading testimonies of injury involves rethinking the relation between the present and the past: an **emphasis on the past** does not necessarily mean a conservation or entrenchment of the past (see Chapter 8).11 Following bell hooks, our task **would be ‘not to forget the past but to break its hold’** (Hooks 1989: 155). In order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attachments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of political action. Bringing pain into politics requires we give up the fetish of the wound through different kinds of remembrance. ***The past is living rather than dead***; the past lives in the very wounds that remain open in the present. In other words, harm has a history, even though that history is made up of a combination of often surprising elements that are unavailable in the form of a totality. Pain is not simply an effect of a history of harm; it is the bodily life of that history. To think through how pain may operate in this way we can consider the document, Bringing Them Home, which is a report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (1996). Bringing Them Home reports on the Stolen Generation in Australia, a generation of indigenous children who were taken away from their families as part of a brutal and shocking policy of assimilation. Generations of indigenous children grew up with little or no contact with their families, or with their community and culture. They were often taken from their homes in a violent manner.

#### Link – narratives: The 1AC’s display of unhappiness and injury separates pain from its bodily containment in the Other, rendering the wound as an object to be obtained. Their narrative positions the judge as a subject to appropriate and then resolve this pain only when they are compelled enough to care, where each ‘successful’ ballot elevates their power over an increasingly invisible Other.

Ahmed 04 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, “The Contingency of Pain”, 2004, Routledge, New York, pp 20-22 //Accessed 1/15/17 GK)

How does pain enter politics? How are lived experiences of pain shaped by contact with others? Pain has often been described as a private, even lonely experience, as a feeling that I have that others cannot have, or as a feeling that others have that I myself cannot feel (Kotarba 1983: 15). And yet the pain of others is continually evoked in public discourse, as that which demands a collective as well as individual response. In the quote above from a Christian Aid letter, the pain of others is ﬁrst presented through the use of the word ‘landmines’. The word is not accompanied by a description or history; it is assumed that the word itself is enough to evoke images of pain and suffering for the reader.2 Indeed, the word is repeated in the letter, and is transformed from ‘sign’ to the ‘agent’ behind the injuries: ‘Landmines are causing pain and suffering all around the world.’ Of course, this utterance speaks a certain truth. And yet, to make landmines the ‘cause’ of pain and suffering is to stop too soon in a chain of events: landmines are themselves effects of histories of war; they were placed by humans to injure and maim other humans. The word evokes that history, but it also stands for it, as a history of war, suffering and injustice. Such a letter shows us how the language of pain operates through signs, which convey histories that involve injuries to bodies, at the same time as they conceal the presence or ‘work’ of other bodies. The letter is addressed to ‘friends’ of Christian Aid, those who have already made donations to the charity. It focuses on the emotions of the reader who is interpellated as ‘you’, as the one who ‘probably’ has certain feelings about the suffering and pain of others. So ‘you’ probably feel ‘angry’ or ‘saddened’. The reader is presumed to be moved by the injuries of others, and it is this movement that enables them to give. To this extent, the letter is not about the other, but about the reader: the reader’s feelings are the ones that are addressed, which are the ‘subject’ of the letter. The ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’ the reader should feel when faced with the other’s pain is what allows the reader to enter into a relationship with the other, premised on generosity rather than indifference. The negative emotions of anger and sadness are evoked as the reader’s: the pain of others becomes ‘ours’, an appropriation that transforms and perhaps even neutralises their pain into our sadness. It is not so much that we are ‘with them’ by feeling sad; the apparently shared negative feelings do not position the reader and victim in a relation of equivalence, or what Elizabeth V. Spelman calls co-suffering (Spelman 1997: 65). Rather, we feel sad about their suffering, an ‘aboutness’ that ensures that they remain the object of ‘our feeling’. So, at one level, the reader in accepting the imperative to feel sad about the other’s pain is aligned with the other. But the alignment works by differentiating between the reader and the others: their feelings remain the object of ‘my feelings’, while my feelings only ever approximate the form of theirs. It is instructive that the narrative of the letter is hopeful. The letter certainly promises a lot. What is promised is not so much the overcoming of the pain of others, but the empowerment of the reader: ‘I hope you feel a sense of empowerment.’ The pain of the other is overcome, but it is not the object of hope in the narrative; rather, the overcoming of the pain is instead a means by which the reader is empowered. So the reader, whom we can name inadequately as the ‘Western subject’, feels better after hearing about individual stories of success, narrated as the overcoming of pain as well as the healing of community. These stories are about the lives of individuals that have been saved: ‘Chamreun is a survivor of a landmine explosion and, having lost his leg, is all the more determined to make his community a safer place in which to live.’ These stories of bravery, of the overcoming of pain, are indeed moving. But interestingly the agent in the stories is not the other, but the charity, aligned here with the reader: through ‘your regular support’, you have ‘helped to bring about’ these success stories. Hence the narrative of the letter ends with the reader’s ‘empowerment’. The word ‘landmines’, it is suggested, now makes ‘you’ feel a sense of empowerment, rather than anger or sadness. This letter and the charitable discourses of compassion more broadly show us that stories of pain involve complex relations of power. As Elizabeth V. Spelman notes in Fruits of Sorrow, ‘Compassion, like other forms of caring, may also reinforce the very patterns of economic and political subordination responsible for such suffering’ (Spelman 1997: 7). In the letter, the reader is empowered through a detour into anger and sadness about the pain of others. The reader is also elevated into a position of power over others: the subject who gives to the other is the one who is ‘behind’ the possibility of overcoming pain. The over-representation of the pain of others is signiﬁcant in that it ﬁxes the other as the one who ‘has’ pain, and who can overcome that pain only when the Western subject feels moved enough to give. In this letter, generosity becomes a form of individual and possibly even national character; something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have, which is ‘shown’ in how we are moved by others. The transformation of generosity into a character trait involves fetishism: it forgets the gifts made by others (see Diprose 2002), as well as prior relations of debt accrued over time. In this case, the West gives to others only insofar as it is forgotten what the West has already taken in its very capacity to give in the ﬁrst place. In the Christian Aid letter, feelings of pain and suffering, which are in part effects of socio-economic relations of violence and poverty, are assumed to be alleviated by the very generosity that is enabled by such socio-economic relations. So the West takes, then gives, and in the moment of giving repeats as well as conceals the taking.

#### Link – power to the state: They give too much credence to the institutions - The effect of university policies aimed at helping oppressed bodies vanishes in thin air, but the legal walls created stay in place. On-campus activists are put into a situation where they constantly make futile policies, while the university ignores its commitments. Only totally reorienting our existence in universities can we ever confront the walls that are constructed.

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To have evidence of a policy is not sufficient for the policy to be enacted. In this example the head of human resources removed the decision from the minutes: you can see here how the removal of evidence of something is an attempt to modify an arrangement. However what is being modified is the record of a modification. We learn how stasis can involve work: to keep an old arrangement you remove traces of the policy having been changed. [but it] was however put back in the minutes. This put back was a result of yet more diversity work: noticing the removal of evidence is evidence of labour. But then: when the practitioner tells her colleagues in meetings that the policy has changed, they look at her “like she is saying something really stupid.” She might as well not have any evidence because as far as they are concerned the policy has not been changed. The story of a diversity policy that does not do anything is a tantalizingly tangible example of what goes on so often. But even if the story makes something tangible (and that it is so is a result of the labour and testimony of a diversity worker – think of how many tales like this are not told), it shows us how some things are reproduced by remaining intangible. This remaining is “stubborn,” a stubbornness that is not dependent upon an individual (although it can involve individuals) but an effect of how things combine. She has evidence; she can point to it; but it is as if she has nothing to show. Diversity work: you learn that intangibility is quite a phenomenon. Intangibility can be the product of institutional resistance. And that is a philosophical as well as political point because it teaches us that what is not evident to the senses is not simply about the status of an object. The object here is not missing or even withdrawn. The object is right there. And it is there because the right procedures have been followed to make it there. An object that has been brought into existence does not appear. Something is not perceived despite being available or near to hand: you can not notice what is right in front of you without having to make any effort to turn away. Paper can disappear because the content of the decision that is recorded on that paper is not in agreement with what has “really” been decided, a decision that takes the form of a momentum; a direction that does not need to made into a directive because it is shared. That a policy can be agreed without being followed teaches us that a policy and a direction are not the same thing. Perhaps changing policies is a way of sustaining a direction, because those appointed to do equality and diversity (and appointments are often made to comply with the law) end up spending their time working on policies that do not do anything. As one practitioner I spoke to once said: “you end up doing the document rather than doing the doing.” Doing the document. Not doing the doing. You can see why diversity workers often talk about walls when they talk about their work. Diversity work is a “banging your head against a brick wall job.” As I commented in an [earlier post](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/10/hard/), what makes an institutional wall even harder is that it is not a concrete or actual wall. If there was a wall there, we could point to it. The wall might then provide evidence of itself: a wall as self-evident. Although, to qualify this (as optimism) we have also learnt something is not always perceived even when it is tangible. What makes an institutional wall harder is that unless you come up against it (because of who you are, or what you are trying to do), this wall does not appear. The walls that diversity workers speak about are assumed as phantom walls: in your head not in the world. Racism and sexism are walls in this sense: in the world but assumed as in our heads not in the world. We have to live with that assumption. In the world. What is a phantom for some for others is real. What is hardest for some does not appear to others. And so: a policy disappears despite there being a paper trail, despite the evidence, or even because of the evidence. People disappear too, because of what they make evident, of what they try to bring into view. There are many ways in which you can end up disappearing. The story I have shared with you is one story of disappearance. And it is not just a policy that disappears in the story. A diversity worker: she ends up exhausted because despite all her efforts the same thing is still happening. Sometimes you stop because it is too hard to get through. So she might leave, or turn her energy toward something else: a new policy, a new document, a new job. And: this practitioner left her post soon after I interviewed her, for another post in another university. What happens to a policy can happen to a person. People disappear too: because of what they try to make evident, what they try to bring into view. What is evident, I implied at the start, is often a weaker sense: something is evident to someone. What is evident: a matter of perception. We are now learning: perception matters. The removal of evidence is an institutional process that renders somethings not evident to those who inhabit that institution. It is as if: nothing is there. No policy, no paper. Maybe a person appears, but you look at her blankly. What is she waving around! What is she going on about! The wall that you come up against, that blocks a progression (of a policy or a person), is not encountered by those who do not come up against it. There; nothing there. [No wonder](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/10/24/heavy-histories/): There becomes despair.

### Killjoy K – Link: “Neoliberalism”

**Their critique of neoliberalism is simply a mask that positions students that disagree with curriculum as a threat to the magnificent past of the university. Their critique is a regressive strategy to return the power of academic elites to the top of the ivory tower**

**Ahmed 15** (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism/ Ahmed, Sara. Article from her independent research blog: Against Students Posted on June 25, 2015. Web. //Accessed 2/16/17 GK)

We need to challenge this assumption that some subjects only come into existence because universities are “in hot pursuit” of the “student purse.” We know the strong critiques of curriculum made by those working within departments that led to the diversification of the curriculum. We know of the work of “chipping away” at the walls that are sometimes called canons. We know of the long histories of feminist and queer activisms that led to sexuality as well as gender being taken up as legitimate subjects within the academy. If we don’t know, we should know. These histories of labour and activism are “swept away” by the assumption that such subjects only come into existence because of the “student purse.” It is this activism that enabled a challenge to some of the decisions made by departments as well as dons about what is of value; decisions that solidify as canons. These decisions are often protected by assumptions of universality, which is a way of making a decision “indefensible” (the usual sense of indefensible is unjustifiable – I want to make this mean “that which does not need justifying”). The various subjects made possible through the labour of political critique and activism are dismissed in the flourish of a “rather than,” as simple expressions of the wanton nature of the market (that monstrous body). The figure of the consuming subject, who wants the wrong things, a student who is found wanting, is hard at work. She is how: an idea of universal knowledge or universal culture can be so thinly disguised as a critique of neoliberalism and managerialism. She is how: an academic world can be idealised in being mourned as a lost object; a world where dons get to decide things; a world imagined as democracy, as untroubled by the whims and wishes of generations to come.[3] We have an understanding of how: when students are being critical of what we are doing, when they contest what is being taught, they can be treated and dismissed as acting like consumers. In other words it is when students are not satisfied that they are understood as treating our delivery as a product. Critique as such can be “swept away” by the charge of consumerism. Students become the problem when what they want is not in accordance with what academics want or what academics want them to want: students become willful when what they will is not what academics will or not what academics will them to will. What seems to be in place here is what Paulo Freire (1970) called the “bank model” of education in which teachers deposit knowledge into the bodies of students like money into a machine. Rather ironically, students are more likely to be judged as acting like consumers when they refuse to be banks. Luckily I would say: don’t bank on it.

### Killjoy K – Link: Offendability

**Their criticisms of safe spaces and student-led censorship position over-sensitive student as a threat to the supposed happiness and coziness of academic institutions. Critiques of offendability are a racialized, gendered, and sexual strategy to reclaim lost hegemony won by oppressed bodies**

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The figure of the consuming student has something to say to other figures such as the censoring student. I now want to return to an earlier post “You are Oppressing Us.” I referred to one letter that mobilised the figure of the censoring student (this letter has since been supplemented by yet more letters – one of which even equates alleged “no platforming” in the UK with various acts of extremism around the world). This letter speaks of how some have been stopped from speaking on campuses because they articulate viewpoints that are out of line with the views held by students (who are treated as remarkably consistent, as body or thing, and I am partly tracking what is achieved by this consistency). The figure of the censoring student exists in close relation to that of the consuming student: both work to create an impression that students have all the power to decide what is being taught as well as what is not being taught, what is being spoken about as well as what is not being spoken about; and that this power is at the expense not only of dons and departments, but also politicians, journalists and other public figures. Students: they keep coming up as having all the power. Really? Yes, really. I noted in my previous post how the letter relies on flimsy evidence because it is assembled around a desire for evidence. Indeed the instances of apparent censorship (translate: student protests) seemed to generate more discourse and discussion rather than preventing discourse or discussion. When students who protest against such-and-such speaker become censors, those who wrote and signed the letter become the ones who are silenced, whose freedoms are under threat. So much speech and writing is generated by those who claim they are silenced! But we can still ask: what is the figure of the censoring student doing. **By hearing student critique as censorship the content of that critique is pushed aside. When you hear a challenge as an attempt at censorship you do not have to engage with the challenge. You do not even have to say anything of substance because you assume the challenge as without substance.** In the first instance, critique and contestation (“they want the wrong courses!”) is dismissed as consumerism; in the second instance, protest (“they don’t want the right people!”) is dismissed as censorship. Sweep, sweep. Beep, beep. Error message. Another figure comes up, rather quickly, at this point: she is often lurking behind the censoring student. This is the over-sensitive student: the one who responds to events or potential events with hurt feelings. She also comes up as someone who stops things from happening. We can refer here to a number of recent pieces that I would read as a moral panic about moral panics. Many of these pieces refer to US college campuses specifically and are concerned with the introduction of safe spaces, and trigger warnings. The figure of **the over-sensitive student is invested with power**. The story goes: **because students have become too sensitive, we cannot even talk about difficult issues in the classroom; because of their feelings we (critical academics) cannot address questions of power and violence, and so on**. **A typical example of this** kind of rhetoric: **“**No one can rebut feelings, and so the only thing left to do is shut down the things that cause distress — no argument, no discussion, just hit the mute button and pretend eliminating discomfort is the same as effecting actual change.” Or another: “while keeping college-level discussions ‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, **it’s bad for them and for everyone else**. **People ought to go to college to sharpen their wits and broaden their field of vision.”** **Here safety is about feeling good, or not feeling bad.** We sense what is being feared: students will become warm with dull edges, not sharp enough in wit or wisdom. The moral panic around trigger warnings is a very good pedagogic tool: we learn from it. **Trigger warnings are assumed as being about being safe or warm or cuddled. I would describe trigger warnings as a partial and necessarily inadequate measure to enable some people to stay in the room so that “difficult issues” can be discussed**. The assumption that trigger warnings are themselves about safe spaces is a working assumption (by this I mean: it is achieving something). Indeed what I have said is rather misleading because the assumption that safe spaces are themselves about deflecting attention from difficult issues is another working assumption. Safe spaces are another technique for dealing with the consequences of histories that are not over (a response to a history that is not over is necessarily inadequate because that history is not over). **The aim is to enable conversations about difficult issues to happen: so often those conversations do not happen because the difficulties people wish to talk about end up being re-enacted within spaces, which is how they are not talked about.** For example conversations about racism are very hard to have when white people become defensive about racism: those conversations end up being about those defences rather than about racism. We have safe spaces so we can talk about racism not so we can avoid talking about racism! The very techniques introduced to enable the opening up of conversations can be used as evidence of the closing down of conversations. Anyone with a background in Women’s Studies will be familiar with this: how we come up against stereotypes of feminists spaces as soft, cosy, easy, which are the exact same sexist stereotypes that make Women’s Studies necessary as a feminist space. The very perception of some spaces as being too soft might even be related to the harshness of the worlds we are organising to challenge. The idea that students have become a problem because they are too sensitive relates to a wider public discourse that renders offendability as such a form of moral weakness (and as being what restricts “our” freedom of speech). **Much contemporary racism works by positioning the others as too easily offendable, which is how some come to assert their right to occupy space by being offensive.** And yes: so much gets “swept away,” by the charge of being too sensitive. A recent example would be how protests against the Human Zoo in the Barbican, about how racism is disguised as art or education, are swept up as a symptom of being “over-sensitive. According to this discourse, anti-racists end up censoring even themselves because they are “thin skinned.” **So much violence is justified and repeated by how those who refuse to participate in violence are judged. We need to make a translation. The idea that being over-sensitive is what stops us from addressing difficult issues** can be translated as: we can’t be racist because you are too sensitive to racism. Well then: we need to be too sensitive if we are to challenge what is not being addressed. We might still need to ask: what is meant by addressing difficult issues? It is worth me noting that I have been met with considerable resistance from critical academics when trying to discuss issues of racism, power and sexism on campus. Some academics seem comfortable talking about these issues when they are safely designated as residing over there. Is this “there” what allows “difficult issues” not to be addressed here? In fact, it seems to me that it is often students who are leading discussions of “difficult issues” on campus. But when students lead these discussions they are then dismissed as behaving as consumers or as being censoring. How quickly another figure comes up, when one figure is exposed as fantasy. If not over-sensitive, then censoring; if not censoring, then consuming. And so on, and so forth.

### Killjoy K – Link: Deleuze

#### Their fetishization of movement and fluidity is violent because it essentializes what it means to be fluid, excluding oppressed bodies that are unable or can’t afford that risk

Ahmed 04 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, “The Contingency of Pain”, 2004, Routledge, New York, pp 151-152 //Accessed 9/15/16 GK)

Furthermore, the positing of an ideal of being free from scripts that deﬁne what counts as a legitimate life seems to presume a negative model of freedom; deﬁned here as freedom from norms. Such a negative model of freedom **idealises movement and detachment, constructing a mobile form of subjectivity that could escape from the norms that constrain what it is that bodies can do.** Others have criticised queer theory for its idealisation of movement (Epps 2001: 412; Fortier 2003). As Epps puts it: ‘Queer theory tends to place great stock in movement, especially when it is movement against, beyond, or away from rules and regulations, norms and conventions, borders and limits . . . it **makes ﬂuidity a fetish’** (Epps 2001: 413). The idealisation of movement, or transformation of movement into a fetish, **depends upon the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way. Bodies that can move with more ease may also more easily shape and be shaped** by the sign ‘queer’. It is for this reason that Biddy Martin suggests that we need to ‘stop deﬁning queerness as mobile and ﬂuid in relation to what then gets construed as stagnant and ensnaring’ (Martin 1996: 46). Indeed, the **idealisation of movement depends upon a prior model of what counts** as a queer life, which may **exclude others, those who have attachments that are not readable** as queer, **or** indeed those **who may lack the** (cultural as well as economic) **capital to support the ‘risk’ of maintaining antinormativity as a permanent orientation**.

### Killjoy K - addons - framing

#### Their notion of agency misses the prior question of who gets access to being an agent In the first place – women and women of color are excluded from idealistic conceptions of agency without the k’s consciousness of social structures reproducing inequality

Rodruiguez 11 (Dalia Rodriguez,2011, Qualitative Inquiry, “Silent rage and the politics of resitstance: countering seductions of whiteness and the road of politization and empowerment” https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/155f2644f681f418?projector=1 )

For feminists of color, theorizing has always occurred in the margins (Hurtado, 1992; Pollard & Welch, 2006). As women of color, we occupy a precarious position in academe. Despite being invisible, ignored, disrespected, and our work often devalued, women of color have redefined the margins (hooks, 1984) often through our scholarship. By writing about our experiences in the margins, we pro- vide rich insight as to our roles as faculty, researchers, and mentors. Rejecting the dominant’s definition of reality is central in enabling women of color in developing a positive self-concept (hooks, 1990). We actively resist external definitions, and self-define, seeing ourselves as survivors rather than victims. Only recently has this perspective been recognized. Holding an outsider within position (Collins, 1986) and being in the margins allows for a unique perspective that includes understanding the dominant group’s actions as well as their espoused ideologies. The perspective from which women of color view our marginality is central in defining ourselves. Instead of accepting this marginality as disabling, we reconstruct our own definition of who we are— to reflect a positive image, rather than negative. Regardless of our reality of experiencing oppression daily, we always have the power to redefine self. We cannot live our lives based on what the colonizer’s definition is of us, we need to define who we are on our own terms. As hooks argues, “We are not looking for that Other for recognition. We are recognizing ourselves . . .” (hooks, 1990, p. 22). Despite the limits set on women of color, the power lies within us to redefine the self. However, redefining self is only part of the process of becoming subject. The other critical part of becoming subject is becoming critically conscious of how social structures reproduce inequality. Becoming subject emerges as one comes to understand how structures of domination work in one’s own life, as one develops critical thinking and critical consciousness, as one invents new, alternative hab- its of being, and resists from that marginal space of differ- ence inwardly defined (hooks, 1989). Fundamental to claiming our right to subjectivity is the insistence that we must deter- mine how we will be and not rely on colonizing responses to determine our legitimacy. Becoming personally empow- ered through self-knowledge, even within conditions that severely limit one’s ability to act is essential for the libera- tion process. Change can occur internally—in the private, personal space of an individual woman’s consciousness. Collins (2000) argues, By persisting in this journey of becoming more critically conscious toward self-definition, we can empower our- selves. When linked with each other, our individual struggles take on a new meaning. A changed consciousness encour- ages people to change the conditions of their lives and this change occurs through action. A critical mass of individuals with a changed consciousness can in turn foster women’s collective empowerment. The process of becoming subject also includes, moving from silence to language, from indi- vidual, to group action (Lorde, 1984).

### Killjoy K – DA Hate Speech

#### Only when we are free from our masculine restrictions can we then solve for hate speech and its violence against bodies deemed as Other

**Hatfield et al. 5** [Hatfield, Katherine L., Schafer, Kellie, Stroup, Christopher A., 2005, Atlantic Journal of Communication, “A Dialogic Approach to Combating Hate Speech on College Campuses”, acc. 7/11/16, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, Speech Communication and Dramatic Arts Central Michigan University, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, pp. 43]

Owen (1998) wrote that “words can turn into bullets, hate speech can kill and maim, just as censorship can ... we are forced to ask: is there a moment where the quantitative consequences of hate speech change qualitatively the arguments about how we must deal with it?” (p. 37). This study was conducted to determine whether engaging students in discourse about hate speech would affect their perceptions of the appropriateness of hate speech. Tests indicated that when engaged in the discourse, participants are more likely to decrease their perception of appropriateness and have a more overt reaction to the hate messages.